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MARKET STRUCTURE AND
POLITICAL LAW: A TAXONOMY OF
POWER
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT & LINA KHAN
INTRODUCTION
Market structure is deeply political. One reason is that all markets
1
are governed by law. The structure of a market at any given time is
the product of political decisions—made and not made—about how
players in that market will be allowed to use their power. Another
reason market structure is political is that power in the market affects
us as citizens. Ever-increasing corporate size and concentration
undercut democratic self-governance by disproportionately
influencing governmental actors, as recognized by campaign finance
reformers. Often overlooked, corporate structure is also political
because it inscribes what we can and cannot do, and hence imposes on
citizens a form of private governance unaccountable to the public. In
competitive markets, the freedom to choose among buyers and sellers
limits the power of any one actor. Conversely, in highly concentrated
markets a few dominant companies can assume enough power to
restrain, and even control, the actions of others.
Because market structure is political, legal rules—like those found
in antitrust or the public purpose doctrine adopted by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)—can shape economic power
and potentially divest it when it threatens to undermine the political
system. This premise, shared by Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson,
and Louis Brandeis, is based on the understanding that decentralized
economic power and democratic self-government are deeply
2
intertwined. Oligarchy or monopolization in one realm (political or
Copyright © 2014 Zephyr Teachout and Lina Khan.
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2. See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS
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economic) leads to monopolization and oligarchy in the other.
Unfortunately, this belief has fallen into desuetude in law as legal
scholarship has built up a division between the study of economic and
political power. The separation constitutes an unnecessary—and
arguably ideological—division that has undermined the capacity of
laws to explicitly regulate the economy and the political system
respectively. Therefore, the regulation of one must be understood in
terms of its impacts on the other.
The goal of this Article is to create a way of seeing how market
structure is innately political. It provides a taxonomy of ways in which
large companies frequently exercise powers that possess the character
of governance. Broadly, these exercises of power map onto three
bodies of activity we generally assign to government: to set policy, to
regulate markets, and to tax. We add a fourth category—which we call
“dominance,” after Brandeis—as a kind of catchall describing the
3
other political impacts. The activities we outline will not always fit
neatly into these categories, nor do all companies engage in all of
these levels of power—that is not the point. The point is that Bank of
America and Exxon govern our lives in a way that, say, the local ice
cream store in your hometown does not. Explicitly understanding the
power these companies wield as a form of political power expands the
range of legal tools we should consider when setting policy around
them.
The taxonomy intends to categorize activities ranging from the
most obvious exercises of political power to the least obvious. Some
exercises of political power are fairly overt—such as spending money
to elect or defeat a candidate. Some are largely interpreted as nonpolitical, but have political import, such as money spent by a company
attempting to oust a rival. There are various kinds of power in
between, including the power wielded by creating and disseminating
public information.
Any final definition of “power” is elusive. Thomas Hobbes defined
power as a man’s “present means, to obtain some future apparent
4
good.” It is also frequently described as “that state of affairs which
holds in a given relationship, A-B, such that a given influence attempt
OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (1934); WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM:
EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 163 (1913).

A CALL FOR THE

3. We recognize the fundamental indeterminacy of these terms. We use them as
scaffolding and to encourage a way of seeing.
4. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 54 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651).

TEACHOUT 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

12/20/2014 4:35 PM

MARKET STRUCTURE & POLITICAL LAW

39
5

by A over B makes A’s desired change in B more likely.” Power may
be exercised through force, coercion, tradition, wealth, social status,
resource control, information, or persuasion. Likewise, “politics” is not
susceptible to easy definition. For our purposes, we are interested in
the ways in which companies either act as political institutions (by
claiming authority to govern, either within their industry or within
society as a whole), or as political organizations, by greatly impacting
those political institutions, either through design or structure. Our
taxonomy is not absolutely inclusive, but covers the primary ways in
which companies in modern American society wield power.
Our purpose is to create an integrated vantage point through
which to see the political effects of how markets are structured. We
hope to expand the academic scope of those studying elections, and
support a larger understanding of how concentrated corporate power
perverts the democratic polity through means other than campaign
donations and lobbying. The implication is that those concerned with
preserving authentic democratic self-governance should focus their
efforts on restoring antitrust policy, and that campaign finance reform
should be seen as deeply connected to antitrust policy. Because of the
dynamic interaction between these forms of political economic power,
concentrated market structure enacts a form of private governance
that threatens democratic self-government.
This Article joins a new frontier in the debate about the scope of
6
antitrust, adding to a growing body of scholarship. We begin in Part I
5. OLANIKE F. DEII, GENDER AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: INTRODUCTION 269 (2011).
6. We build on scholars such as Maurice Stucke, Rudy Peritz, and Tom Horton, to
expand a field that has for decades limited itself to addressing consumer welfare. See, e.g.,
RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 241
(rev. ed. 2001); Thomas J. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 823 (2013); Rudolph J. R. Peritz, A Counter-History of
Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263 (1990); Maurice Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53
B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012). We also, however, draw from thinkers not traditionally thought of as
writing in the field of “competition policy,” like banking expert Simon Johnson and
telecommunications scholar Susan Crawford. See generally SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE
AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE
(2013) (discussing the political power of the telecommunications industry); SIMON JOHNSON &
JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL
MELTDOWN (2011) (discussing the political impact of finance concentration). Others have
thoroughly explored the history of political antitrust and explained why the modern “efficiency
and consumer welfare” model of antitrust is “bad history, bad policy, and bad law.” Robert
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–53 (1979). We also
expand on academics like corporate law and governance professor James Kwak, who
interrogates forms of political influence, like cultural and cognitive capture, that operate outside
of material self-interest. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
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by developing our taxonomy of political power, documenting how the
absence of competition enables companies to exert power over
individuals in explicit and implicit ways, implicating us as citizens. In
Part II, we document how the law traditionally viewed company size
and concentration through a political lens, and why that changed. In
Part III, we suggest that America should return to a political vision of
corporate structure, and examine the implications this has for
recovering antitrust policy.
Throughout, we discuss size and concentration, which we take to
be connected. Our concern with size is with regard to size relative to
the total economy. A company’s political power is at its apex when it
is both large in terms of the economy and plays a dominant role in its
own markets.
Because companies wielding these forms of power enact a form of
governance over us, in Part IV we argue that corporate market
structure rules should be understood as political rules. The mutual
segregation of corporate law and political theory has undermined
each field’s capacity to explain, understand, and propose solutions.
Therefore, scholars and lawmakers ought to treat a certain category of
corporations (as defined by structure and size) as political
organizations, and treat the rules governing those corporations as
“political rules.”
Our goal is not to sketch out specific solutions but to create a way
of thinking about the problem and gesture to a traditional means of
addressing it. A political economy dominated by large companies,
along with economies of scale in the purchase of political power, is a
problem for representative democracy. For democratic purposes, an
economy populated by many small businesses is preferable to an
economy dominated by large and concentrated industries. Excessive
corporate size tends to hurt democratic self-government because it
enables a handful of actors to purchase disproportionate political
power and to subject citizens to systems of private governance that
become less accountable the bigger and fewer the corporations.
We will use the words “antitrust” and “monopoly” throughout the
Article. In doing so, we do not refer to the particular meanings as
interpreted in existing law. Instead, we refer to a general spirit.
Antitrust means, for us, government power to limit company size and
71, 71 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).
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concentration; this incarnation is an ethos, not a legal term. Monopoly
for our purposes refers to “situations in which sufficient control would
be exercised over price by an individual producer or by a colluding
group of producers to make possible monopoly profits, i.e., profits
above the rate necessary to induce new investment in other industries
7
not subject to monopoly control.” This definition animates our usage,
but does not exhaust it: Monopoly-like or even oligopolistic situations
can enable the exercises of political power we describe below, and
hence also warrant the concerns we raise in this Article.
I. FORMS OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
It is beyond the scope of one article to explore all the politicaleconomic repercussions of an economy dominated by large
companies. Instead, we will focus on three broad forms of political
power: (1) the power to set policy, (2) the power to regulate, and (3)
the power to tax. We discuss each in turn with an eye to how these
exercises of power exhibit characteristics of governance. We are not
saying these activities are always conducted with explicit political
intent or that they are all innately political—just that when large
companies in uncompetitive markets undertake them, the power they
levy is government-like. Because these activities can set policy,
regulate, and tax, they affect our lives not just as consumers but also
as citizens.
In business law, these forms of power might be called a subset of
“nonmarket” strategies. As David Bach and David Bruce Allen wrote
recently:
Nonmarket strategy recognizes that businesses are social and
political beings, not just economic agents. Because companies
create and distribute value, a plethora of actors seek to influence
them—formally, through laws and regulation, and informally,
through social pressure, activism and efforts to shape the public
perception of business. Companies can’t escape this. Smart
executives, therefore, engage with their social and political
environment, helping shape the rules of the game and reducing the
risk of being hemmed in by external actors. Yet, few companies are
prepared to do the hard work and commit long term to developing
an effective nonmarket strategy. Fewer still understand how to
integrate market and nonmarket strategies to sustain competitive

7. NAT’L RES. COMM., THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: PART I BASIC
CHARACTERISTICS 139 (Gardiner C. Means ed., 1939).
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8

advantage.

Nonmarket strategy includes public relations, lobbying, legal
change, and market structure. Put another way, “Nonmarket issues
can play out in multiple settings, from courtrooms and regulatory
proceedings to parliamentary committee hearings and industry
forums all the way to the news media, the public domain or the
9
blogosphere.”
Though we do not discuss every nonmarket strategy here (most
importantly, we do not engage with the complicated political role of
direct-to-consumer advertising), the word “nonmarket” is helpful
because it signals that regulation—in the form of antitrust laws or
other rules—would not interfere with “the market,” even according to
the terms of the market participants. However, our investigation is
more expansive than the strategy described above. First, we are
examining the political role of companies, not simply the political
choices facing an individual company. Second, we are less interested
in the actual strategic choices made, and more interested in the
exercise of power. When it comes to democracy, the accidental feudal
lords are every bit as important as those who set out to gain political
power. Therefore, our portrait assumes the unity of the “company,”
instead of treating shareholders and insiders differently.
When describing the power exercised by these companies, we use
terms like “dominant,” “monopolistic,” and “oligopolistic.” Our use of
these terms is consciously imprecise. Because we are interested in
categorizing the forms of power born of size and concentration,
debates about the technical contours of these terms are secondary,
and potentially irrelevant, to our work.
A. Power to Set Policy
The five categories of power we describe below are political
because they drive legislation, sway rule making, and shape regulatory
agendas. These vectors of power point to Washington, D.C. These
activities range from highly conscious, overtly political, and semivisible (i.e., campaign donations and lobbying), to subtle and largely
invisible (i.e., directing the politics of employees). The source of the
power is not always size, but size coupled with concentration
8. David Bach & David Bruce Allen, What Every CEO Needs to Know About NonSLOAN
MGMT.
REV.
(Apr.
1,
2010),
Market
Strategy,
MIT
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/what-every-ceo-needs-to-know-about-nonmarket-strategy/.
9. Id.
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intensifies the force and reach of these categories of power.
1. Power through Campaign Funding
The first way companies exercise political power is the most
obvious. We call this “overt investments for direct political influence.”
They include all the overt uses of financial resources to shape public
policy and influence the traditional political process in ways favorable
to the company.
Companies spend a lot of money in politics. Companies may lobby
elected officials directly, lobby regulators, or play a large role in trade
associations that lobby. Companies can either create PACs that spend
money on campaigns, making access to decision-makers easier, or use
SuperPACs or LLCs to spend independently. During the financial
reform bill fight of 2010, the financial industry officially employed
2565 lobbyists, used media campaigns to explain how the crisis
10
happened, and donated generously to candidates.
Charities aspire to exert influence this way too. Though some
socially responsible spending is done for non-political reasons, some is
done to enable political power. One recent instance of such strategic
involvement in charities comes from Comcast’s pending merger with
Time Warner Cable. Executive Vice President David Cohen oversees
government affairs at Comcast, but also runs its charitable
foundation, which gave $320,000 to the Hispanic Chamber of
11
Commerce over a five-year period. When the Comcast merger was
announced, the New York Times reported on the connection, noting
that one of the first supporters of the merger was the Hispanic
12
Chamber. Another example of this kind of political involvement is
Toyota’s successful lobbying to get California to give low-emissions
vehicles preferred high-occupancy vehicle lane access: “With
minimum financial investment, Toyota managed to give its product a
13
decisive competitive advantage.”

10. Suzanna Andrews, The Woman Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2011),
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/11/elizabeth-warren-201111.
11. Eric Lipton, Comcast’s Web of Lobbying and Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/business/media/comcasts-web-of-lobbying-andphilanthropy.html?_r=0.
12. Id.
13. See Bach & Allen, supra note 8.
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2. Power through Staffing and Recruiting from Government
The second way in which corporations exercise political power is
by staffing employees of and recruiting employees from government.
This famed “revolving door” enables companies to shape political
outcomes explicitly by writing policy and taming enforcement, and
implicitly by inculcating worldviews and inscribing the parameters of
possible outcomes. The former agribusiness lobbyist who joins the
Food and Drug Administration may loosen labeling requirements if
he intends to return to industry, while the Department of Justice
enforcer who aspires eventually to join J.P. Morgan may hesitate to
antagonize a potential employer.
Congressional aides frequently rotate through the revolving door.
Since 2007, more than 1650 staffers have registered to lobby within a
14
year of leaving Capitol Hill. The economics line up: Roughly twothirds of revolving door lobbyists generate more revenue trying to
15
influence legislation than lawmakers earn for writing legislation.
And companies pay a premium for public sector experience—
lobbyists who have served in government generate three times as
16
much in revenue than those who have not.
A paragon of revolving door dynamics is the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The last six SEC enforcement chiefs
have taken jobs at top private firms and banks including JPMorgan
17
Chase and Bank of America. According to the Project on
Government Oversight (POGO), from 2001 through 2010 more than
400 SEC alumni filed close to 2000 disclosure forms stating they
18
planned to represent a client before the agency. As the POGO

14. Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Law Doesn’t End Revolving Door on Capitol Hill, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 1, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/lawdoesnt-end-revolving-door-on-capitol-hill/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
15. Lee Drutman & Alexander Furnas, K Street Pays Top Dollar for Revolving Door
FOUND.
BLOG
(Jan.
21,
2014,
9:00
AM),
Talent,
SUNLIGHT
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/01/21/revolving-door-lobbyists-governmentexperience/.
16. Id.
17. Ben Protess, Slowing the Revolving Door Between Public and Private Jobs, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Nov. 11, 2013, 1:35PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/slowing-therevolving-door-between-public-and-private-jobs/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
18. PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING DOOR AT SEC
CREATES
RISK
OF
REGULATORY
CAPTURE
8
(2013),
available
at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/602191/20130211-dangerous-liaisons-sec-revolvingdoor.pdf. As POGO notes, “Those disclosures are just the tip of the iceberg, because former
SEC employees are required to file them only during the first two years after they leave the
agency.” Id. at 2.
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report explains, former SEC employees have, among other favorable
outcomes, helped companies win exemptions and obtain regulatory
19
relief in the form of “no action letters.” The New York Times found
close to 350 instances over the last decade where the SEC gave major
Wall Street banks and other financial institutions a pass on fraud and
20
related sanctions.
It is difficult to prove that ties to corporations or aspirations to
work for them ever shape any particular vote or decision on
enforcement or policy, as officials can always offer explanations for
21
why they believe a certain choice advanced the public interest. And
at least one study has rebutted the idea that revolving door dynamics
22
weaken SEC regulation. Some people even argue that the desire to
join private practice actually incentivizes tough enforcement, which
23
can raise one’s profile and showcase one’s expertise.
Rank material self-interest is not the only driver of regulatory
capture, however. Even if enforcers do not explicitly or consciously
trace industry demands, social ties between regulators and the
regulated can tilt policy. James Kwak and others expand traditional
capture theory to include non-rational forms of influence—like
identity, status, and relationships—that gently yet insistently tug policy
in a direction favorable to the regulated. Kwak terms this
phenomenon “cultural capture.” Highly pedigreed financiers and
financial regulators will share alumni networks and block parties, and
the nature of those bonds matters. Asking how economic policies that
contributed to the 2007 financial crash had won such widespread
credence, Kwak writes:
Although several signs of traditional capture were present—
notably a well-oiled revolving door between regulatory agencies
and industry—the argument for capture in the strict sense is

19. See id. at 10–14.
20. Edward Wyatt, SEC is Avoiding Tough Sanctions for Large Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/business/sec-is-avoiding-tough-sanctions-for-largebanks.html.
21. Nor do industry ties necessarily predict lax enforcement. For example, Gary Gensler, a
former partner at Goldman Sachs, served as an aggressive head of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission.
22. Ed deHaan et al., Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC’s Enforcement?, AM. ACCT.
ASS’N (August 2012), http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sec-revolving-door-study-july2012.pdf.
23. Id. See also Jed S. Rakoff, Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
REV.
OF
BOOKS
(Jan.
9,
2014),
Prosecuted?,
N.Y.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executiveprosecutions/.
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weakened by a plausible alternative explanation: that agency
officials were genuinely persuaded by the argument that free
financial markets were good for the public. In this light, the
important question is why theories of the world that are wrong or
at least widely contested gain broad acceptance in a specific
community—here, the community of financial regulatory agencies.
Where the underlying theories require highly specialized expertise
(such as advanced degrees in financial economics) and are
empirically contested, it would be naïve to expect policy debates to
turn solely on the intellectual merits of the parties’ positions.
Cultural capture provides an alternative explanation of how policy
is formed—neither through simple corruption nor through purely
rational debate, but through the soft pressures that arise from the
24
specific characteristics of the regulatory community.

Notably, even after the financial collapse proved certain
deregulatory theories wrong, those theories still shaped how officials
responded. The way regulators handled the wreckage—their instincts,
their priorities—was very telling of the assumptions they shared with
financial executives. This is not per se a criticism of how the Treasury
Department and Federal Reserve steered us through the aftermath—
when each day brought fears of new tremors—but an observation that
certain policies that would have rankled financial executives were
never on the table. A team comprised of Larry Summers and Timothy
Geithner shared a worldview with Jamie Dimon and Lloyd Blankfein:
a set of unspoken beliefs about the role and benefits of markets. That
common ideology narrowed the Overton window, foreclosing a
25
certain set of policy responses.
3. Power through Creating Information
Another way companies exert political power is through creating
and disseminating information, both to encourage a favorable
(de)regulatory environment, and to steer specific rules or laws.
Industry trade groups frequently publish reports opining on policy, or
directly hire scholars to produce research. Many professorships and
university positions are founded or funded by companies and their
charity arms.

24. Kwak, supra note 6, at 71.
25. The “Overton window” describes the relatively narrow range of potential ideas and
policies that decision-makers and influencers consider politically acceptable, and hence possible.

TEACHOUT 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

12/20/2014 4:35 PM

MARKET STRUCTURE & POLITICAL LAW

47

For example, the four biggest telecommunications carriers—
AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile—spent approximately $37
million in 2013 lobbying the FCC on a range of policy issues. But they
spent almost twice as much on “influence campaigns”—paying
26
universities, think tanks, and public relations firms. By issuing an
onslaught of research, companies can shape policy through
“information capture.” As Wendy Wagner writes:
In the regulatory context, information capture refers to the
excessive use of information and related information costs as a
means of gaining control over regulatory decision-making in
informal rulemakings. A continuous barrage of letters, telephone
calls, meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal comments, post-rule
comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices of appeal
from knowledgeable interest groups over the life cycle of a
rulemaking can have a “machine-gun” effect on overstretched
27
agency staff.

To take a recent instance of how this can play out, as part of the
2008 Farm Bill, Congress instructed the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to update the Packers and Stockyards Act, a
1920s-era law in disrepair. In 2010 the USDA published its proposed
rule, which would have closely policed how meat packers and
processors wield their market power against farmers, and reined in
abusive practices, such as the payment scheme known as the
28
“tournament system.” These rules would have ushered in sweeping
reforms across the industry, leveling the playing field between the
world’s biggest meat companies and independent farmers. So the
meat lobby got working. By late 2010, the National Chicken Council
had commissioned a study estimating that the rule would cost the
29
broiler industry more than $1 billion over five years. The National
26. Allan Holmes, The Wireless Wars, SLATE (Mar. 21 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/03/at_t_verizon_t_mobile_sprint_a
nd_auctioning_airwaves_the_corporate_giants.html. As James Thurber, a professor at
American University who has been studying lobbying for thirty years, noted: “Lobbying isn’t
just what the federal registered lobbyists do. It’s an orchestration of a variety of techniques and
influence. . . . This includes all the advertising, white papers, surveys, grass-roots, and top-roots
activities going on.” Id.
27. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010).
28. Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation
and Energy Act of 2008; Conduct in Violation of the Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 35338, 35343 (proposed
June 22, 2010). See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
29. Thomas E. Elam, Proposed GIPSA Rules Relating to the Chicken Industry: Economic
Impact, NAT’L CHICKEN COUNCIL (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/111610-FarmEcon-Economic-Impact-Study-of-Proposed-Rule.pdf.
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Meat Association funded research that approximated the new rule
30
would cost the United States economy close to 23,000 jobs. The
American Meat Institute released yet another report pegging the cost
at $14 billion of GDP, $1.36 billion in lost tax revenue, and 104,000
31
jobs. Tyson, meanwhile, submitted a 335-page legal brief, which
challenged almost every portion of the rule, as well as the agency’s
authority to enforce it. In a notable concession to the industry, the
USDA agreed to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the rule. And by
the time it issued the final rule, over half of the provisions had been
diluted or abandoned, including one that would have made it easier
32
for farmers to sue meat companies for unfair or deceptive practices.
Research has been a key weapon for financial institutions striving
to thwart new regulations in the wake of the 2007 crash. The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—the 828page financial reform law Congress passed after the crisis—delegated
significant rulemaking for around 400 regulations to government
agencies, inviting parties to besiege policymakers with studies to
shape final outcomes. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association paid top professors at Stanford, Harvard, and other elite
33
institutions to produce research commenting on the proposed rules.
These studies uniformly decried the regulations, predicting they
would raise costs across the board and sap markets of liquidity.
Scholars also published these views in the op-ed pages of the New
30. Economic Impact of GIPSA’s Proposed Rules, NAT’L MEAT ASS’N (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.meatami.com/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/64288.
31. Ron Hays, USDA Secretary Vilsack Says Agency Will Perform Cost Benefit Analysis of
FARM
RPT.
(Dec.
14,
2010),
GIPSA
Rule,
OKLA.
http://oklahomafarmreport.com/wire/emails/media/01347_Oklahomas_Farm_News_Update1214
2010.html.
32. Compare Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food,
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008; Suspension of Delivery of Birds, Additional Capital
Investment Criteria, Breach of Contract, and Arbitration, 76 Fed. Reg. 76874, 76884 (Dec. 9,
2011) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201) (“[T]he provisions in the final rule were modified . . .
to reduce, and in some cases substantially reduce the single greatest cost, which was the cost that
could potentially arise due to the potential for litigation or administrative action.”), with
Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation and Energy
Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35340 (proposed June 22, 2010) (noting that the P&S Act
envisioned private litigation as being a potential remedy, as it sets forth procedures for such
litigation).
33. In 2011 the House of Representatives repealed a requirement that those giving expert
testimony reveal their ties to the private sector. Lee Fang, The Scholars who Shill for Wall
Street, THE NATION (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/176809/scholars-who-shillwall-street#; Emily Flitter et al., Special Report: For Some Professors, Disclosure is Academic,
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/20/us-academics-conflictsidUSTRE6BJ3LF20101220.
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York Times and Wall Street Journal, and testified in congressional
hearings on issues like derivatives regulation or the Volcker Rule—
34
often without disclosing their financial conflicts-of-interest.
Beyond issuing reports directly and paying academics for specific
studies, companies also embed themselves in information streams. For
example, since 1967 DuPont has run the DuPont Young Professors
program, which provides $75,000 in annual grants to “encourage
highly original research of value to DuPont while helping the young
35
professors begin their academic career.” Looking through rosters of
faculty at American universities, you will find positions like the Merck
Professor of Biochemical Engineering at Berkeley University, the
Tyson Chair in Food Policy Economics at the University of Arkansas,
and the Walgreen Distinguished Service Professor at the University of
Chicago. In 2001, the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation donated
$3 million to George Mason University to expand a program in
36
“experimental economics.” The growing reach of corporate influence
on scholarship has been chronicled both by Jennifer Washburn in
37
University, Inc. and the 2010 film “Inside Job.”
The point here is not that all privately funded study is an overt
attempt by corporations to influence policy or the political process—a
billionaire might fund, say, cancer research because he lost a loved
one to the disease, or space exploration because of a childhood
38
dream. But information and how it is interpreted are integral to how
government makes decisions on an issue (not to mention how public
opinion understands it or a journalist reports on it), and at any given
moment on any given topic the total set of available information is
shaped, in increasing part, by corporations looking to advance
39
favorable policy. In this way, companies play the role of political
actor.

34. Reuters reviewed nintey-six testimonies given by eighty-two academics to the Senate
Banking Committee and House Financial Services Committee between late 2008 and 2010 and
found no clear standard for disclosure and that a third of those testifying did not reveal their
financial affiliations. Emily Fliter et al., supra note 33.
35. Press Release, DuPont on DuPont Young Professors (June 16, 2011), available at
http://www2.dupont.com/Media_Center/en_US/daily_news/june/article20110616a.html.
36. Id.
37. See generally JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE
CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2006); INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010).
38. Williams J. Broad, Billionaires with Big Ideas are Privatizing American Science, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/science/billionaires-with-big-ideasare-privatizing-american-science.html?_r=0.
39. Id.
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4. Power to Direct the Politics of Employees and Contractors
Dominance and lack of competition also empower companies to
direct the political choices made by employees and suppliers. This
exercise of power is more common in monopsony situations than
monopoly.
Take chicken farming. Four poultry processors control around 53
40
percent of the market in the United States. Regionally, concentration
41
is even higher. Practically this means that chicken farmers are often
beholden to a single company, with scant bargaining power to
negotiate the terms of their contracts. The industry is vertically
integrated, which means processors hatch the chicks, mix the feed,
42
slaughter the birds, and package the meat for market. They leave
farmers to actually raise the birds, the riskiest and most capitalintensive part of the business. Farmers usually take on hundreds of
thousands of dollars in loans to build poultry houses and purchase
heaters to warm the birds and ventilation systems to cool them, all to
43
the company’s specifications.
Meanwhile, farmer pay is
unpredictable and occasionally arbitrary because chicken processors
like Tyson pay farmers through the “tournament system,” which pits
farmers against one another by pegging their pay to their ranking,
44
with no accountability or transparency. Farmers know that if they
protest or challenge the company, it can cut them off—and sink their
livelihood.
In 2009, the Obama administration announced it would convene a
series of workshops to assess the state of consolidation in agricultural
markets. Attorney General Eric Holder and Agriculture Secretary
Tom Vilsack toured the country to hear directly from farmers about
45
the conditions they faced. For many farmers, the opportunity was a
lifeline. But in the days before the poultry hearing in Alabama,
representatives from Tyson and Pilgrim’s Pride visited farmers to
warn them that if they spoke out at the hearing they would face

40. The Economic Cost of Food Monopolies, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Nov. 2, 2012),
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/reports/the-economic-cost-of-food-monopolies/.
41. Id.
42. CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET 23 (2014); Lina Khan, Obama’s Game
MONTHLY
(Nov.
2012),
of
Chicken,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/november_december_2012/features/obamas_gam
e_of_chicken041108.php?page=all.
43. Khan, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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46

retaliation. As farmers at the hearing recounted, scores of others had
not shown up or were afraid to speak up because of the companies’
47
threats. For many farmers, their economic dependence lost them
their right to free speech and assembly.
In other instances, companies like Tyson do not need to exert their
power; its sheer existence quells dissent. For example, Christopher
Leonard narrates the account of Tyson employee Perry Edwards in
The Meat Racket:
[Perry] Edwards did not see any evidence that Tyson Foods
delivered sick birds to [long-time farmers] Jerry and Kanita
Yandell to retaliate against them for any perceived bad behavior.
But what he observed was that the company had the ability to do
so if it wanted to. Farmers around Waldron did not have the frontseat view of this power that Edwards was afforded. But they knew
it existed. They felt it. They perpetually feared it. And for that
reason, they often stifled their complaints and took what Tyson
48
gave them.

Political power is also expressed through direct communication to
employees about the political preferences of CEOs (an expression
49
enabled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ).
Although the letters may not, according to law, intimidate the
employees, they can strongly communicate a preference and list
reasons justifying it. During the 2012 election, presidential candidate
Mitt Romney asked business owners to use their power in this way: “I
hope you make it very clear to your employees what you believe is in
50
the best interest of . . . their job . . . in the upcoming elections.” Real
estate developer David Siegel sent a long letter to his employees,
telling them that if Obama won, he would probably end up on a beach

46. Id.
47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE
WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY
ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD 10 (May 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf.
48. LEONARD, supra note 42, at 38. Political suppression is also common in battles over
unionization. For example, in 2012 a federal judge found that Target managers had threatened
to discipline employees who talked about the union and threatened to shut the store if workers
voted in favor of unionization. Steven Greenhouse, Union Gets New Election at Target, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/business/new-union-vote-ordered-attarget-store-in-valley-stream-ny.html.
49. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
50. Nate C. Hindman & Christina Wilkie, Wynn Employee Voter Guide Pressures Workers
POST,
(Oct.
26,
2012),
to
Vote
Right,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/25/wynn-employee-voter-guide_n_2018595.html.
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“without employees.” And Steve Wynn sent a voter guide to his
52
employees. It is not clear that these crude tactics work: One Wynn
Resorts employee said, “Now that I’m being told who to vote for by
53
my overlord, maybe I’ll just vote for Obama.” However, if
employees feel pressure or are otherwise influenced, these
communications act as a form of employer-employee political power.
5. Too Big to Fail
Even in the absence of resources devoted to purchasing political
influence, a company with a large relative size to the economy will
have power. Bank of America’s assets are over 1 percent of the
54
United States GDP. Exxon Mobil made $45 billion dollars in profits
55
in 2008. When the relative size of a company is significant—certainly
anything approaching 1 percent of GDP—democratic choices become
constrained by the self-interest of the individual corporation. The
relative size makes it incumbent upon legislators to design laws that
will at a minimum ensure the stability of the company. Dominant
firms breed uncertainty and instability in key resources—and that
56
uncertainty leads to political power. If Lockheed Martin goes under
and lays off all its employees, it will have an impact on the entire
economy. Therefore, the largest companies, even without lobbying,
can make demands of government based on the threat of their own
failure.

51. Scott Keyes, Billionaire CEO Threatens to Fire Employees if Obama Wins,
THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 9, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/10/09/978211/davidsiegel-fire-employees/.
52. Hindman & Wilkie, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. As of December 2013, Bank of America’s total assets amounted to $2.1 billion, while
the United States GDP hovered around $16 trillion. See Holding Companies with Assets Greater
than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR., http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/top50form.aspx
(last updated Dec. 31, 2013); US Real GDP by Year, MULTPL.COM, http://www.multpl.com/usgdp-inflation-adjusted/table (last updated Mar. 31, 2014).
55. John Porretto, Exxon Mobil Reports Record $45.2 Billion Profit for 2008,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/30/exxon-mobilreports-recor_n_162468.html.
56. As Simon Johnson and James Kwak argue in their book, blogs, and articles, this
structure reeks of oligarchy. Gigantic firms are a real threat to self-government. If big
corporations can demand bailouts and dictate policy it takes away the ability of the people to
choose the policies they most want. The policy is “chosen” by the people in the same way that
someone with a gun to their head “chooses” to do what the holder of the gun tells them to. See
generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 6.
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Companies that are large relative to the size of American GDP
use this power by threatening to collapse or leave if their demands are
not met. After the recent financial crisis, because of the size (relative
to the economy) of the biggest banks and investment firms, politicians
made the decision that they should not be allowed to fail and bring
the country down with them. Putting aside the banks causal role in
the crisis (which is itself arguably a function of relative size), imagine
that there were 10,000 banks, instead of 5, facing restructuring. The
government could have allowed some to fail while others were
restructured. Though the government might still have chosen to
provide a bailout, it could have had more bargaining power with the
banks in determining the size of the bailout. You can think of this kind
of size as the “too big to fail” rent, a promised subsidy that enables
cheap capital and that cheapens the cost of seeking political power.
B. Power to Regulate
We describe two exercises of power: the power to govern what is
in a market and the power to self-regulate. Both are political because
they enable private actors to steer markets in a way akin to
regulation. Unlike the power to set policy, the power to regulate
bypasses Washington. It governs through the marketplace. Notably,
this form of power is largely born through economic dominance and
market power.
As we describe above, large companies routinely win favorable
regulations by influencing the political process through lobbying and
revolving door tactics. A more direct and less visible way to set
regulations is to be a monopolist. The standards a dominant company
sets can determine the course of an industry much like a government
agency does. Take, for example, how Wal-Mart steered the deodorant
market. Through the early 1990s, almost all deodorant containers
came packaged in a paper-box. Wal-Mart executives decided the box
57
added unnecessary cost, and told suppliers to eliminate it. So the
suppliers did. Today practically no deodorant comes packaged in a
box. As Charles Fishman observes, “[w]hole forests have not fallen in
part because of the decision made in the Wal-Mart home office at the
intersection of Walton Boulevard and SW 8th Street in Bentonville,

57. CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT: HOW THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL
COMPANY REALLY WORKS—AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1
(2006).
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Arkansas, to eliminate the box.” Seen this way, the effects of WalMart’s decision resemble a prohibition by the Environmental
Protection Agency designed to save trees.
What is more, the more concentrated the market, the greater the
governing power. For example, if we have a competitive shampoo
market, whether there are toxins in our shampoo will be determined
by hundreds of executive teams at hundreds of firms with competing
interests. But if one company monopolizes the shampoo market, that
same decision will be made by a few executives sharing one common
interest. In the latter scenario, the shampoo company enjoys power
akin to a government, without being accountable to the public.
Similarly, if there is only one seller of all books, that seller is capable
of exercising arbitrary power over the content of our books—akin to
the censorship power of government.
A recent example of how dominant companies become de facto
regulators centers around Zilmax, the feed hormone used to bulk up
cattle in the final weeks of their lives. Though the additive hit
commercial markets in 2007, research showing it harmed the quality
59
of beef kept feedlot owners from buying it. Enter Tyson, JBS, Cargill,
and the National Beef Packing Company. Once the four meatpackers,
which control 85 percent of the market, began accepting Zilmax-fed
60
animals, its adoption rapidly spread across the whole industry. By
late 2012, even feedlots leery of its side effects realized they would
61
have to start using it if they wanted to stay in business. But when
reports surfaced that cattle fed with Zilmax were struggling to walk
and were displaying strange symptoms, its abandonment was equally
swift. On August 9, 2013, Tyson, the biggest meat company in the
world, announced it would no longer buy Zilmax-fed livestock. On
62
August 16, Zilmax-producer Merck said it was suspending sales. No
government agency intervened at any point; rather, it was a handful of
executives that governed the quality of our beef supply.

58. Id. at 2.
59. Christopher Leonard, Why Beef is Becoming More Like Chicken, SLATE (Feb. 14,
2013,
4:55AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/food/2013/02/
zilmax_the_cattle_growth_drug_that_s_making_beef_more_like_chicken.2.html.
60. The Economic Cost of Food Monopolies, supra note 40.
61. Leonard, supra note 59.
62. Theopolis Waters & Tom Polansek, Amid Cattle Health Concerns, Merck Halts Zilmax
Sales, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/16/us-merck-zilmaxidUSBRE97F0S320130816.
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Meanwhile, policies set by Facebook regulate the online privacy of
63
over 1.2 billion users worldwide. Four airline companies govern
which cities in America receive affordable and regular air service and
64
which are cut from the grid. Rules decided by the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange—which has swallowed up the Chicago Board of
Trade, the Kansas City Board of Trade, and the New York Mercantile
65
Exchange—now determine how our corn, wheat, and oil are priced.
This observation about de facto regulatory power is different from
a critique of deregulation. We are not arguing that companies are
presently making decisions that ought to be made by government. We
are saying that when you have one company or small group of
dominant companies making decisions that effectively set standards
for the rest of the industry, those outcomes take on the character of
governance. The crucial difference, of course, is that corporations,
unlike government, are not accountable to the public.
The other form of regulatory power is more overt and often
comes in the form of an explicit suggestion that an industry “selfregulate.” There is a large body of literature—both praising and
critical—of corporate self-regulation. An industry “self-regulates”
when most of the industry participants agree on standards of
professionalism or safety, appropriate content, or environmental rules.
Therefore a dominant company within an industry can directly
“regulate” that industry through a trade association or other
important self-regulatory body.
C. Power to Tax
The most difficult form of private political power to document is
the power to impose a tax on the public. Unlike the power to set
policy or to regulate—whose exercise does not always guarantee the
desired outcome, or whose direct impact can be difficult to assess—
the power to tax costs the public immediately, at the moment the
63. Jemima Kiss, Facebook’s 10th Birthday: From College Dorm to 1.23 Billion Users, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb 3. 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/04/facebook-10years-mark-zuckerberg.
64. Phillip Beau, New American Airlines Means ‘Big 4’ Control US Skies, CNBC (Feb. 14,
2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100461115; Lina Khan & Philip Longman, Terminal Sickness,
WASH. MONTHLY (March/April 2012), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/
march_april_2012/features/terminal_sickness035756.php?page=all.
65. The three major exchanges—where the bulk of commodity futures are traded—are
self-regulatory organizations. “Although all four exchanges have been merged to form CME
Group, each exchange remains a separate self-regulatory organization.” Rulebooks, CME
GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/rulebook/ (last visited June 10, 2014).
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power is exercised. Admittedly, “tax” is imprecise. We use “tax” to
connote the systemic capture of resources for private ends. One
dictionary defines tax as “a compulsory contribution to state revenue,
levied by the government on workers’ income and business profits or
66
added to the cost of some goods, services, and transactions.” By
definition it might seem that a private party cannot “tax” because the
direction in which the money flows is innate to the meaning of tax.
But for a significant and longstanding part of economic theory,
monopolies were thought to impose a kind of tax. As Arnold Kling
puts it, describing consumer costs when there is a monopoly: “Note
that if the industry were competitive and the government imposed a
$200 per bushel tax on wheat, the result for the consumer would be
the same. There is the same ‘deadweight loss’ for the economy. The
only difference between a government tax and the monopoly ‘tax’ is
67
that the ‘profits’ accrue to the government.”
It is widely established—in both antitrust theory and the world
around us—that size and concentration correspond with market
power. Market power enables a company to raise what it charges
consumers and lower what it pays suppliers. The higher margins that it
pockets serves to transfer wealth from consumers and suppliers to its
own account. It, in essence, imposes a tax on those subject to its
power.
This wealth transfer empowers the company at the expense of its
customers and suppliers, both politically and economically.
Oftentimes these transfers will accrue in fractions of pennies, almost
imperceptibly. Barry C. Lynn recounts how Henry Osborne
Havemeyer, after rolling up seventeen sugar refineries, astutely asked,
“Who cares for a quarter cent of a pound?”:
Havemeyer meant that he did not intend to use the power he had
amassed over our supply of sugar to gouge us suddenly and
violently. Rather, he intended to collect his quarter of a penny tax
from us quietly and steadily, the same way our local governments
collect a few pennies from us quietly and steadily every time we
buy a Slurpee at 7-Eleven. . . . For many decades, every time an
American sprinkled some sugarcane crystals into his or her tea,
Havemeyer and his family became just a bit richer and hence a bit

66. Tax Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
us/definition/english/tax (last visited June 19, 2014).
67. Arnold
Kling,
The
Problem
of
Monopoly,
ARNOLDKLING.COM,
http://arnoldkling.com/econ/markets/monopoly.html (last visited June 19, 2014).
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68

more politically powerful than you and me.

These wealth transfers are all the more subtle in dull and
quotidian industries like, for example, container board, the corrugated
material we use to box over 95 percent of all delivered packages in
69
the United States. As noted in a recent Goldman Sachs
memorandum, steady consolidation since the 1990s has handed the
top four companies control over 70 percent of the market, with the
70
largest player alone holding 33 percent. In subsequent years the
71
firms restricted supplies and raised prices. Margins spiked from 10
percent in 2003 to 18 percent last year—while the containerboard
72
prices we all pay jumped 90 percent. Or take the seed industry, in
which Monsanto controls upwards of 80 percent of genetic traits
embedded in corn and soybeans, and together with DuPont sells 70
73
percent of all corn seed. Since Monsanto’s roll-up of independent
seed companies, its net profits have grown from $267 million in 2003
74
to $2.5 billion last year—a staggering tenfold increase over ten years.
The inflation-adjusted price farmers pay for corn seed, meanwhile, has
75
shot up 166 percent since 2005.
When sufficient market power enables a company to extract more
wealth from consumers and employees than the company could
absent that market power, the additional income it collects acts like a
tax. Furthermore, the wealth transfers in concentrated markets are
political because they make big companies bigger and enrich their
executives and shareholders, handing both the firm and top
individuals more political power.

68. BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE RISE OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE
ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 48 (2010).
69. GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL INV. RES., DOES CONSOLIDATION CREATE VALUE? 10–
11 (2014).
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 10–11.
72. Id.
73. Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Squeezes Out Seed Business Competition,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 13, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/13/monsantosqueezes-out-see_n_390354.html; Jeff Swiatek, AgReliant: Corn Seed Breeder Growing
STAR,
Nov.
4,
2013,
Competition,
INDIANAPOLIS
http://www.indystar.com/article/20131103/BUSINESS/310280001/.
74. Emiko Terazono & Neil Munshi, Monsanto at Centre of Intensifying Debate on Food,
TIMES,
Feb.
26,
2014,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
FIN.
e5eef102-9990-11e3-b3a2-00144feab7de.html.
75. Jacob Bunge, Big Data Comes to the Farm, Sowing Mistrust, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25,
2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579369283869192124.
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D. Dominance
Our taxonomy illustrates how size absent competition can impose
a form of private governance on the public. A dominant company is
unaccountable to citizens for the power it exerts, yet that power
determines and even constrains their actions. The first three
categories—campaign funding, staffing and recruiting from
government, and controlling information streams—capture how
companies strive to influence the political process. These forms of
power are the most discrete and discernible; projects like
76
opensecrets.org devote significant resources to tracking them. Other
forms of power—“too big to fail,” political punishment, regulation,
and tax—illustrate forms of political power exercised outside the
traditional political process. This key influence is won not just through
size and capital but also—crucially—through market structure. These
forms of corporate power can undercut democratic self-governance in
ways untouched by campaign finance reform. The political process is
not the only highway to undue political control.
In addition to operating outside of the traditional political process,
this type of power is notable because its application does not always
require its active exercise. Power can arise purely out of dominance.
As Justice Louis Brandeis stated:
Restraint of trade may be exerted upon rivals; upon buyers or
upon sellers; upon employers or upon employed. Restraint may be
exerted through force or fraud or agreement. It may be exerted
through moral or through legal obligations; through fear or
through hope. It may exist, although it is not manifested in any
overt act, and even though there is no intent to restrain. Words of
advice, seemingly innocent and perhaps benevolent, may restrain,
when uttered under circumstances that make advice equivalent to
command. For the essence of restraint is power; and power may
arise merely out of position. Wherever a dominant position has
77
been attained, restraint necessarily arises.

In other words, power can be experienced without being
exercised. Our taxonomy is not exhaustive, and never could be,
precisely because power exerts itself in infinite discreet guises. That
this power still threatens democratic self-government—even when it
does not manifest as concrete schemes or donations—suggests that
76. See generally OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org.
77. Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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reformers should look beyond policing activity. They should also
target structural advantages that derive from concentration and size.
There are other incidental political impacts of market structure on
political society as a whole not captured by the seven ways we discuss.
For democratic self-government to work, society must be populated
by people who are educated enough to know the impacts of policies,
and be somewhat capable of imagining other policies or other
impacts. There is something harder to capture than information alone
that is critical for successful self-government—it is a sense among the
governed that they are fundamentally competent to challenge the
decisions of their representatives and that they experience actual
power in the political process. Without this experience of power,
citizens will engage in self-government in the most limited of ways—
voting—and their ability to govern themselves will be restricted by
the choices presented by those in power. The exercise of power
cannot be taught by a textbook—it is a habit. Of course the most
extreme Jeffersonian view is that self-government requires a country
78
of yeoman farmers who are trained and accustomed to power. John
Stuart Mill and William Greider have also argued that the experience
people have 364 days a year necessarily impacts how they conduct
themselves on the one day a year when they vote. If someone is
constantly told what to do, prohibited from questioning authority,
punished for raising complaints, and rewarded for docility in all other
aspects of their lives, how can we expect her when she encounters a
Congress member on the street, to ask about why the new health care
law does not provide for dental policy, even if her daily grievance is
79
the inability to pay for dental care?
Access to the experience of power is directly related to corporate
structure. When there are bigger businesses, there are fewer people in
management positions, and more people who have no daily
relationship to power (or who experience it only as subjects). There
are fewer people who work with or witness executive decisionmaking. Imagine five major tire companies in this country instead of
one thousand, and five executives instead of one thousand. If evenly
distributed over the fifty states there would be twenty executives in
each state willing to challenge political power, instead of five states
78. See generally Benjamin F. Wright, The Philosopher of Jeffersonian Democracy, 22 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 870 (describing the works of John Taylor, one of Thomas Jefferson’s
contemporaries, who wrote extensively on the American farmer as the democratic ideal).
79. See, e.g., WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE (1993).
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with executives and forty-five with none. Setting aside their expertise
in tires, those twenty executives could be political presences in every
major city in the country, both exhibiting and modeling the vibrant
sense of self that is required for true self-government.
If one out of every twenty people in a society is in a decisionmaking role, that mode of thought—of responsibility taking—has a
chance of being part of the civic culture. The culture of responsibility
taking deeply infuses itself into our lives and changes our internal
grammar from “x is happening to me” to “I am part of changing x.”
The internal grammar of the private decision-maker bleeds into the
internal grammar of the citizen—when she is fluent with power in one
sphere, it bleeds to the other.
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC LENS OF TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST
The idea that companies can act as a form of private government
is not new. The primary expression of this concept is in competition
policy. “Monopoly” was originally used to describe an exclusive grant
of power from the government to work a particular trade or sell a
80
specific good. In Britain, monarchs would sometimes abuse this
power. Dissatisfied with the funds Parliament allocated her, Queen
Elizabeth routinely issued royal monopolies as a revenue-generating
81
scheme. Citizens protested that these exclusive trade privileges
imposed an undue burden on them in addition to the burden they
82
already bore paying taxes to Parliament. The higher prices they paid
to the royal monopoly served, in essence, as a private tax that accrued
83
to the Queen.
Thomas Jefferson was openly anti-monopoly, as seen in his fear of
84
how patents distort power in the political marketplace. He supported
an anti-monopoly provision in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights,
85
putting it on par with the First Amendment. Though the Whigs and
the Democratic-Republicans disagreed on the importance of
monopolies, even the most whiggish centralizer assumed that for most
80. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 984 (2012).
81. Id. at 989.
82. Id. at 989–90.
83. Id. at 990.
84. Silvio Bedini, Godfather of American Invention, in SMITHSONIAN BOOK OF
INVENTION 82– 83 (Alexis Doster, III et al. ed., 1978).
85. HOWARD WALTER CALDWELL & CLARK EDMUND PERSINGER, A SOURCE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 279 (1909).
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industries, a widely distributed array of producers was necessary. A
popular economic textbook from the 1860s stated: “A general
Distribution of Capital is . . . of prime importance. By this is meant
such a condition of things that the capital of a country shall be in
many hands rather than few. . . . [G]reat aggregation of capital in the
possession of individuals is disadvantageous because it leads
87
inevitably to despotic assumption.” Articles in the Harvard Law
Review and the North American Review condemned the growth of
concentrated economic power as “feudalism” and a “great,
88
unscrupulous, powerful plutocracy.” One contemporary decried the
“political menace that resided in these stupendous aggregations of
89
wealth.” The belief that decentralized economic power was essential
for (and inextricable from) political liberty was a mainstay view of the
day.
The first federal antitrust law, The Sherman Act, was understood
at the time in terms that we now associate with campaign finance
90
laws. When the Sherman Act passed Congress in 1890, Senator John
Sherman called it, “A bill of rights, a charter of liberty,” and crowed
91
about its importance in both economic and political terms. Senator
Sherman viewed the monopolist as another form of monarch. On the
floor of the Senate in 1890, he declared:
If we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any
of the necessities of life. If we would not submit to an emperor, we
should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent
92
competition and to fix the price of any commodity.

Law Professor James May’s exploration of the Sherman Act’s
intellectual antecedents shows that for Senator Sherman and the Act’s
congressional supporters, economic and political freedoms were seen
as part of a piece. May summarizes the debates around the enactment
of the Sherman Act as indicating a “widespread congressional
86. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 80, at 993.
87. FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 92 (1886).
88. James Hudson, Modern Feudalism, 144 N. AM. REV. 277, 290 (1887); D.M
Mickey, Trusts, 22 AM. L. REV. 538, 549 (1888). We are indebted to David Millon for these
quotations. See generally David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1219, 1227–28 (1988).
89. E. Benjamin Andrews, Trusts According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117,
150 (1889).
90. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–7 (West 2014).
91. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890).
92. 21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2457 (1890).
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commitment to the long-established ideals of economic opportunity,
security of property, freedom of exchange, and political liberty, and
considerable hope that antitrust law might prove to be an effective
93
vehicle for their substantial, simultaneous realization.” Put another
way, as earlier historians claimed, the “primary motivation of
Congress in enacting the Sherman Act and every significant
amendment was concern about the abusive behavior of economic
giants, real or imagined, and sympathy for their victims, consumers
94
and businessmen deprived of alternatives and opportunities.” The
Act grew out of a long “tradition that aimed to control political power
95
through decentralization of economic power.”
This ideology persisted in related legislation of the early twentieth
century. In 1914, during the passage of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, Senator Cummins explained, “we must do something to preserve
the independence of the man as distinguished from the power of the
corporation; that we must do something to perpetuate the individual
96
initiative.” Senator Cummins argued for a strong antitrust policy
despite some economists’ claims that big companies were better for
the consumer. Conceding the point that aggregation of capital might
lead to cheaper goods, he argued that “we can purchase cheapness at
altogether too high a price, if it involves the surrender of the
individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single
97
master mind.” The “single master mind” to which he referred was a
form of tyranny that could destroy self-government, even if it came in
the technical form of a private company.
Passed in 1914, the Clayton Act prohibited a corporation from
acquiring another corporation when the acquisition would result in a
substantial lessening of competition, or would create a monopoly in
98
any line of commerce. The debates around the Clayton Act—
explored thoroughly by May—show the same political cast. The
House Committee Report on the Act argued that “the concentration
of wealth, money, and property in the United States under the control
and in the hands of a few individuals or great corporations has grown
93. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 288 (1989).
94. Harlan Blake & William Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377,
384 (1965).
95. Millon, supra note 88, at 1220.
96. 51 CONG. REC. 12,742 (1914).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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to such an enormous extent” and it had to be stopped lest it “threaten
99
the perpetuity of our institutions.” One congressman explained:
Enterprises with great capital have deliberately sought not only
industrial domination but political supremacy as well. . . . Great
combinations of capital for many years have flaunted their power
in the face of the citizenship, they have forced their corrupt way
into politics and government, they have dictated the making of
laws or scorned the laws they did not like, they have prevented the
100
free and just administration of law.

Senator Taft’s 1914 book echoed these themes, arguing that
antitrust was essential in fighting the “plutocracy” of the “great and
powerful corporations which had, many of them, intervened in politics
101
and through use of corrupt machines and bosses threatened us.”
Ironically, the greatest burst of antitrust enforcement—as
distinguished from the antitrust laws themselves—was accompanied
by an effort to tone down the political content. Thurman Arnold, who
brought antitrust and competition policy to the center of the
Roosevelt Administration’s economic policy, downplayed the political
problems of scale and concentration, and focused on the economic
102
harms. Arnold is widely recognized for bolstering antitrust by
103
adequately staffing and funding its enforcement. It is unclear what
we should make of Arnold’s agnosticism about the political impacts of
antitrust. On the one hand, one could see Arnold as redefining
antitrust for the country by justifying his enforcement on economic
grounds. On the other hand, one could see him as finally enforcing a
policy that the public had long clamored for—the fact his own
emphasis was on economy instead of politics and power is of little
import. Regardless of Arnold’s framing, the law maintained a political
cast after World War II.

99. H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, at 19 (1914).
100. 51 CONG. REC. 9086 (1914).
101. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 4
(1914).
102. See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMOND ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY
(2005).
103. Under Arnold’s tenure, “the number of Antitrust Division employees grew from
eighteen to nearly five hundred, and the budget more than quadrupled.” Spencer Weber
Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 570, 582 (2004). The
Division reached its peak in 1942 “with a staff of 583 persons and a budget of $2,325,000.
Between 1938 and 1940, the number of new cases jumped from eleven to ninety-two, while the
number of investigations jumped from fifty-nine to two hundred fifteen.” Id.
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Courts, while looking at market share, did not limit themselves to
economic analysis, but saw the role of antitrust in terms of limiting
104
concentrated power in both the economic and political spheres.
Cartels and dominant business interests were associated with the
political economies of Japan and Germany—anti-big-business
sentiments may have come from experience with business cartels
associated with harsh World War I governments in these countries. In
105
1941, the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson openly read
the antitrust statutes in light of, and to be harmonized with, earlier
labor acts that had declared a commitment to decentralized economic
power as part of the public policy of the United States.
In the major antitrust treatise of the late 1950s, Karl Kaysen and
106
Donald Turner wrote about the goals of antitrust. Kaysen and
Turner were both Harvard Law Professors, and Turner later became
the chief antitrust lawyer in President Johnson’s Justice Department.
They argued that the goal of antitrust was a “proper distribution of
107
power” in the economic sphere. This goal, they said, derived from
the work of Thomas Jefferson and principles of autonomy that were
108
central to American political ideology. Moreover, they argued that
“business units are politically irresponsible, and therefore large
109
powerful business units are dangerous.” They saw the goal of the
Sherman Act as being to “protect equal opportunity and equal access
for small business for noneconomic reasons: concentration of
resources in the hands of a few was viewed as a social and political
110
catastrophe.”
Turner and Kaysen’s view was reflected in contemporary court
cases, although the courts were more constrained by the brief text of
the Act. In 1945, Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum
111
first discussed the economic
Company of America (Alcoa),
arguments against monopoly but endorsed the “belief that great
industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of
112
their economic results.” He referred to Senator Sherman’s stated
104. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
105. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
106. See generally CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959).
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id. at 17–18.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 19.
111. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
112. Id. at 428–29.
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concerns about limiting aggregated capital because of the
113
“helplessness of the individual before them.” Moreover, he noted
that later statutes including the Surplus Property Act and the Small
Business Mobilization Act had been rightly interpreted in Hutcheson
to shape the meaning of the antitrust Acts. “Throughout the history of
these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite
of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can
114
effectively compete with each other.” Antitrust as a force for
decentralization was important “for its own sake and in spite of
115
possible cost.”
116
In 1948 in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., Justice Douglas
explained:
We have here the problem of bigness. . . . The philosophy of the
Sherman Act is that . . . all power tends to develop into a
government in itself. Power that controls the economy . . . should
be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people
will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political
prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The
fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and social
minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and command of the
117
Sherman Act.

In 1950, Congress amended the antitrust laws by passing the
118
Celler-Kefauver Act, in response to a burst of merger activity. Like
in the Sherman Act, precise definitions were lacking, but the CellerKefauver Act pressed both political and economic aims. In this era,
the Antitrust Division tended to be very successful in blocking
119
mergers —and the political vision persisted. In 1959, Carl Kaysen

113. Id. at 428.
114. Id. at 429. When the Norris-LaGuardia act of 1932 was passed, not an antitrust act
itself but a labor rights act, it explained that it was the “public policy of the United States” to
protect individual unorganized workers in the face of corporate power. Norris-LaGuardia
described corporate power in terms of “prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid
of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms
of ownership association.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2014).
115. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 429.
116. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
.
117 Id. at 535.
118. Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
119. See JONATHAN BAKER & CARL SCHAPIRO, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235–67
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
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and Donald Turner proposed “no fault” concentration legislation.
121
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States in 1962, the Supreme Court
said that Congress’s vision in the Sherman Act was to “promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
122
business.” Congress understood that this vision might lead to higher
costs and prices, due to costs associated with “fragmented industries
123
However, Congress “resolved these competing
and markets.”
124
considerations in favor of decentralization.”
125
Likewise, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the
Supreme Court upheld the block of a bank merger between the
second and third largest regional banks, which would have led to one
126
bank controlling 30 percent of commercial banking. Despite the
lack of evidence that this 30 percent interest would have negative
effects on competition, the Court held that it need not have
“elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable
127
anticompetitive effects.” Instead, the high market share alone
128
showed “inherently anticompetitive tendency.” The Clayton Act
barred “anticompetitive mergers, benign and malignant alike,” and in
interpreting the statute, the Court recognized that there were
129
concerns about concentration that were not directly measurable.
From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, there was a sea change in
the understanding of antitrust, and a hard-fought intellectual battle
over its purposes. Chicago school theorists Richard Posner and
Robert Bork—building on the work of Aaron Director—argued that
current doctrine was based on flawed economic ideological premises
and that efficiency and consumer welfare—not the goal of aiding
small businesses or having a decentralized economy—were the only
130
legitimate goals of the antitrust statutes. Posner argued that there
was no justification for “using the antitrust laws to attain goals
unrelated or antithetical to efficiency, such as promoting a society of
120. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 106, at 265–72.
121. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
122. Id. at 344.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
126. Id. at 371.
127. Id. at 363.
128. Id. at 366.
129. Id. at 371.
130. See Robert H. Bork & Ward Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
363, 375 (1965).
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131

small tradespeople.” Bork similarly argued that any political or
social
concerns
were
necessarily
indeterminate,
created
132
unmanageable standards, and were normatively unjustifiable.
In every important way, these theorists won the war. However, the
political vision of antitrust remained an essential part of the antitrust
lawyer’s understanding at least through the early 1980s. Though the
courts turned away from checking anything but bad behavior,
politicians with a different economic vision, concerned about
concentration qua concentration, continued to fight for decentralizing
133
economic laws. In 1968, a White House Antitrust Task Force
recommended limiting mergers for companies with more than $500
134
million in sales or $250 million in assets. In 1972, Senator Hart
proposed a “no fault” de-concentration law that would have set an
135
absolute cap on how concentrated industries could become. In 1979,
Ted Kennedy introduced a bill that would have limited mergers of
companies with over $2 billion assets (close to $6 billion in today’s
136
dollars). There was a fierce intellectual debate over the 1968 report
and the 1979 bill, coming as they did when the law and economics
models were gaining strength, and when the traditional, political
137
antitrust people still had significant political power.
Donald Turner, among others, argued that antitrust had always
been a unique area of law—somewhere between constitutional and
traditional statutory law—and that it would always reflect the
138
economic views of the country. But Turner became increasingly
isolated in the 1970s, as the dominant figures in the field adopted
variations of the Posner/Bork model, rejecting both limitations on
corporate size and arguments for decentralized corporate

131. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2 (2d ed. 2001).
132. See generally ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (2d ed. 1993).
133. Phil Neal et al., Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, 2
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Winter 1968–69, at 11, 14–15.
134. Charles Berry, Economic Policy and the Conglomerate Merger, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
266, 266 (1970).
135. Phil Neal et al., supra note 133, at 11.
136. 125 CONG. REC. 12,828–29 (1979).
137. For opposition to the bill, see Donald Baker and Karen Grimm, S. 600–An
Unnecessary and Dangerous Foray into Classic Populism, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 847 (1979). For a
discussion of the debate, see PERITZ, supra note 6, at 379 and Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal
Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 217 (2009) (chronicling the harsh
reaction to the Report that advocated aggressive use of antitrust laws).
138. Donald Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1222 (1969) (citing Justice Hughes for his description of the ways in which
the antitrust acts have features similar to the Constitution).
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competition.
Unfortunately, when the Posner/Bork model came to dominate
antitrust, it did not just infect the particular field of antitrust law, but
also the larger understanding of the relationship between corporate
and political law. We have lost, therefore, the intellectual habit of
seeing through the integrated lens that the earlier political antitrust
framework provided. We see political problems in isolation from
economic ones, diminishing our capacity to analyze either arena
accurately.
The ideological radicalism of these public choice theorists did not
lie in their commitment to “efficiency” and modeling, but in their core
belief that politics and economics are severable. Though their subtheories were debated and discussed at the time, and the empirical
evidence for their claims successfully challenged, the great success of
the “law and economics” movement was in shaping the taxonomies of
study. Economics and business are one area of study; constitutional
law and election law are another.
This separation of economic and political thinking goes very deep
and has shaped popular media, political rhetoric, and activist groups.
Since the 1970s, reformers from left and right have turned their
energies toward laws regulating the shape of the governing
institutions (like Congress), instead of laws regulating the creation
139
and shape of the influencing institutions (like Bank of America).
Though right and left democracy reformers have different sets of
beliefs about corporate law and liabilities, it is rare that either focuses
on antitrust or corporate size and structure. This is not merely
intellectually troubling, it is historically strange; prior to the 1970s,
reformers would talk about money and politics in terms of market
structure as something government could do something about.
It is no accident that the law and economics movement started in
antitrust, which seemed a bit of a backwater, and spread from
antitrust out into other parts of business law. If the law and economics
scholars could convince others that antitrust—the most political of
economic laws—had nothing to do with political culture or elections,
or with representative democracy and power, then it would be far

139. The decline shows itself in absences—the absence of antitrust law in election law
journals, the absence of political discussions in antitrust law casebooks. There have always been
dissenters and critics, but the overall tendency of both disciplines—election law and antitrust—
has been towards ignoring company size and concentration as a political threat.
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easier to convince them that other factors of corporate law and
structure were also fundamentally non-political.
When politics was taken out of economics, the study of economic
structures was gradually extracted from politics. Until Citizens United
forced corporate law scholars to consider the political responsibilities
140
of the SEC, most corporate law and most antitrust law doctrines
assumed an internal world of markets—flawed or successful—
separate from a political world. Frameworks for thinking about
capture, rent, and campaign finance have limited our sense of
possibility—the same players, with different sets of tools (or the same
set, repackaged), return to the same sandboxes over and over again
without looking out over the playground. But this is not the only
sandbox. The tendency to “study markets in splendid isolation from
141
such political acts” can limit the imagination of the person involved
in thinking through democratic design, and can lead to false
conceptions of how the market and government actually work.
Instead of seeing political organizations—like Congress or political
parties—as the only place in which we might make political rules, we
ought to also see corporations as a place to make political rules. In
order to open up corporate structure rules to political conversations,
we must first recognize that corporations are political organizations.
III. TO TACKLE THE SECOND GILDED AGE, HEED LESSONS FROM
THE FIRST
A. Market Structure is Political Structure
Arguably, all corporate forms are political because they owe their
existence to law. When a corporation wields sufficient economic
power, we should view it as a political institution outright, which
means market structure implicates our democratic polity and process.
This view was innate to traditional competition policy and, as our
taxonomy above shows, is still pertinent today.
The political role and relevance of corporations was legitimated
and elevated by the Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion that
corporations are political entities. In Citizens United, the Court held
that a law limiting uncoordinated speech that was designed to elect or
defeat candidates violated the First Amendment, resting its opinion

140. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
141. PERITZ, supra note 6, at 241.
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142

on a few concerns. For the purposes of this Article, what is most
important is that the Court adopted a view that corporations should
be political organizations in order to question, and check, the power
of government—activities we traditionally conceive as responsibilities
of citizenship. The Court called corporate independent spending
143
“indispensable to decision-making in a democracy.” After Citizens
United, the official political theory of the United States is that
corporations are much like—if not exactly like—political parties,
labor unions, and other entities that constitute an essential part of the
political architecture of the country. Its decision turned corporate
involvement in elections from a loophole-seeking practice to a
practice endorsed by the Supreme Court.
Many of the factors that will lead to corporate exercises of
political power are a function of, or correlated with, company size or
market concentration. The capacity to fund elections, achieve
regulatory and information capture, influence employers, create
structural dependencies, regulate markets, and tax are—to a good
degree—furnished by economic dominance.
B. Antitrust and Other Structural Interventions as Political Law and
Tools
Once we see the eight forms of power as integrated and market
structure as political, structural interventions that would seem
illegitimate as mere market interventions instead appear legitimate.
Elections are political institutions and the particular design choices
about them have deep political impacts. For example, the date of
elections, the form of the ballot, the form of voter registration, and
questions about who can appear on the ballot are deeply important
questions of democratic design. Congressional districts are political
institutions and over the last 200 years their size, shape, and type
(single member/multimember) have been changing. In designing their
size, qualifications, and rules regarding government are fundamental
questions of democratic design.
In shaping political institutions, questions of size and scale are
recurrent themes. Since the days of Plato, who thought the ideal size
of a political community was 5040 people, these highly technical
144
questions of size have been front and center in institutional design.
142. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339–41, 372.
143. Id. at 349 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
144. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk 7, pt. IV (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1885) (c. 350 BCE),
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Should a state legislature have a representative for every 5000 people,
or every 50,000? How should campaigns be funded and how much
should individuals be allowed to contribute? How frequently should
elections be held? How should district size be determined? All of
these are basic questions of democratic design surrounding political
institutions. Similar kinds of questions should be addressed to
corporate size.
Up to now, in the public debate about money, power, and
influence in politics, most structural reforms have focused on
Congress and on the laws governing elections. Publicly funded
elections, filibuster reform, and transparency tend to be Congresscentric. Alternatively, laws designed to increase ballot box access,
reform gerrymandering, or include mail-in ballots are electionprocess-centric. Election law scholars debate how campaigns should
work to minimize corruption, what role parties should have, and the
role of the media. But in all these areas the attention is focused on
one or two discrete kinds of levers.
Reformers have focused far less on corporate law itself, yet this
Article argues that addressing market structure—or minimally
viewing it as a site for political action—might help the left and right
both achieve their stated goals. An explicit recognition that many
corporations are political organizations opens up a new category of
structural changes that might improve representative government and
engagement. It enables one to think about incentives and
disincentives for investment in lobbying, for example, not by focusing
on lobbying, but by looking at how corporate size, scope, and industry
concentration interact with lobbying to either encourage more or less
of it. It also enables one to think about how excesses of corporate size,
scope, and industry concentration undercut democratic selfgovernance in ways that lobbying and campaign finance reform do
not address.
The corporate form is a tool that encourages a particular set of
structures. It provides subsidies for certain business activities in
exchange for public goods that would not be created by the
government. Corporate charters can be as expansive or restrictive as
we desire them to be as can corporate liability. Instead of focusing
solely on Congress, the recognition of the corporation as a political
organization allows for a more imaginative approach to the puzzles of
available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.7.seven.html.
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representation, as well as one more attuned to the realities of how
power is exercised.
In teaching the law of politics, it is difficult to paint a fair picture
of the ecosystem of influences that interplay around an election
without a deeper understanding of the political organizations of
corporations, yet the classic portrait painted in election law textbooks
focuses on the internal structure and decision-making of one set of
important political actors—those within political parties—and only
pays a passing glance to the structure of other sets of important
political actors, like media companies and other corporations. This
leads to extensive examination of the rules governing one set of
political actors and almost no examination of the rules governing
another.
It is clear, however, that the market structure in which
corporations act crucially shapes the polity, as well as the ability of
citizens to govern themselves. If the only problem we guard against is
lobbying and campaign donations, we will have a democracy
protected from one exercise of private economic power—bribery—
but not from other ways in which corporations wield power either to
influence government or to govern us. In light of this, our goal in this
Article is modest: to encourage political reformers to view market
structure as a site for governance. Like other political tools and
institutions, such as elections and Congress, market structure can be
designed in a way that promotes democracy or that undercuts it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The hope in this Article is twofold: First, that we encourage a way
of seeing corporate power; and second, that this way of seeing births a
language, or at least starts the process of looking for language—both
to describe this power and to identify the political tools and
mechanisms for harnessing it, scaling it back, or whatever we, as
citizens, decide.
Decentralization of economic power in most areas of commerce is
an essential underpinning of political freedom. A society with strong
voting rights, speech protections, and fair elections cannot realize
democratic principles with an oligarchic economy. For law this means
that antitrust and other de-concentration rules should be understood
not solely as part of corporate law, but also as part of political law. In
this light, a revival of antitrust policy could be one of the most
effective forms of improving democratic self-government in ways that
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are typically associated with campaign finance reform.
Some of this Article has been theoretical, but the issues it
addresses are very current. Six banks largely control the financial
industry. Steady consolidation across agriculture, retail, healthcare,
and manufacturing has left a few dominant companies that each
wields enormous power over their respective industries and our polity.
Their size enables a form of private governance that encroaches on
our rights as citizens. Existing antitrust is far too feeble for the task of
unwinding this power. The public choice theorists who effectively
killed it did not realize that true antitrust was actually their own
intellectual father—the tool that could lead to market
competitiveness and reduce the amount of concentrated money spent
influencing government at the same time.
You can see the American impulse to antitrust appearing in
Jonathan Macey and James P. Holdcroft Jr.’s recent article about
145
limiting bank size, in the business journalist Barry C. Lynn’s book
146
147
Cornered, in Robert Reich’s support for breaking up banks, and
even in Alan Greenspan’s suggestion that companies too big to fail
148
are too big to exist. This impulse is gradually creeping out and
finding its way into legislation. During the financial reform fight,
Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio and Senator Ted Kaufman of
Delaware proposed a simple new law that the New York Times
149
endorsed: They wanted to put a cap on bank size. Brown/Kaufman
would have made it illegal for any financial institution to have nondeposit liabilities (debts and obligations) larger than 2–3 percent of
150
GDP.
This is a good start but far too meager. The largest limited liability
companies are too complex to manage, too difficult to regulate, and

145. Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1370 (2011) (“In our view, the only
precommitment device that enables the government to make a credible promise to refrain from
future massive bailouts is to act preemptively to prevent financial institutions from growing so
large that they become too big to fail.”).
146. See generally LYNN, supra note 68.
147. Robert Reich, Break Up the Big Banks, Says the Dallas Fed, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar.
29, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/dallas-fed-wall-street_b_1388443.html.
148. Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking Up
Large
Banks,
BLOOMBERG (Oct.
15,
2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg.
149. The Hard Work on Financial Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010,
http://prospect.org/article/new-financial-reform-bill-would-break-banks.
150. Id.
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are often effectively immune from criminal prosecutions. Their size
allows them to operate outside of normal democratic constraints and
their use of their economic power undermines our democracy. In
many ways, the excesses of corporate power constitute a defining
challenge of our present moment, yet we have lost the conceptual
tools to fully identify and understand it. Our intent is to recover both
the vision and language to interrogate this power, so that we as
citizens can then decide how to structure and harness it.

